Untersuchte Arbeit: Seite(n): 238, Zeilen: 1-33 |
Original: Seite(n): 901f., Zeilen: 21-35, 1-27 |
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["... Secondly, it is only when there is deemed to be a necessity therefor that amendments are to be proposed, the reasonable implication being that when proposed] they are to be considered and disposed of presently. Thirdly, as ratification is but the expression of the approbation of the people and is to be effective when had in three-fourths of the States, there is a fair implication that that it must be sufficiently contemporaneous in that number of States to reflect the will of the people in all sections at relatively the same period, which of course ratification scattered through a long series of years would not do."[Fn 679] Weiter führte das Gericht diese Lösung deshalb als die tragfähigste an, als sie entgegen der anderen Ansicht nicht die Konsequenz jahrhundertelanger schwebender "proposals" mit sich brächte. Vier Amendmentvorschläge, wozu die zwei zu zählen wären, die im Jahre 1789 den Staaten zugeleitet wurden "are still pending and in a situation where their ratification is some of the States many years since by representatives of generations now largely forgotten may be effectively supplemented in enough more States to make three-fourths by representatives of the present or some future generation. To that view few would be able to subscribe, and in our opinion it is quite untenable."[Fn 680] Was also dem Supreme Court 1921 ohne Gegenstimme untragbar ("untenable") erschien, erwies sich 1992 in Exekutive und Kongress als durchaus vertretbar. Angesichts der Kampagne zum 27. Amendment zeigte sich auch, wie eng das verfassungsrechtliche Instrument Verfassungsergänzung an die politische Wirklichkeit gebunden ist. Die Korrelation zwischen Verfassungsrecht und Politik, die die amerikanische Geschichte wechselvoll prägte, wird auch an diesem Beispiel offenkundig. Inwieweit eim [sic!] 27. Amendment noch von einer "reasonable time period" die Rede sein konnte, war heftig umstritten.[Fn 681] Das Office of Legal Counsel des Justizdepartments legte damals dem Weißen Haus ein Memorandum vor, das die wesentlichen Bezüge zur Dillon-Entscheidung des Supreme Courts herstellte.[Fn 682] Dabei wurden die drei oben genannten "considerations" des Gerichtshofs als nicht überzeugend qualifiziert. So setze der Supreme Court zwar voraus, das Verfahren müsse eher kurz denn ausgedehnt sein, da Vorschlag und Ratifikation als Schritte in einem einzigen Verfahren zu sehen seien. Allerdings sage das Argument, ein Amendment solle seine Notwendigkeit widerspiegeln gerade nichts über die Länge des verfügbaren Zeitraums aus. Dies umso mehr als die Staaten, die erst kürzlich ratifiziert hatten, offensichtlich von der Notwendigkeit des Amendments ausgegangen wären. Auch deute der Umstand, dass ein Amendment das Resultat [eines Konsenses sein sollte, nirgends auf eine Zeitgleichheit der Übereinstimmung hin.] |
["...] Secondly, it is only when there is deemed to be a necessity therefor that amendments are to be proposed, the reasonable implication being that when proposed they are to be considered and disposed of presently. Thirdly, as ratification is but the expression of the approbation of the people and is to be effective when had in three-fourths of the States, there is a fair implication that that it must be sufficiently contemporaneous in that number of States to reflect the will of the people in all sections at relatively the same period, which of course ratification scattered through a long series of years would not do."[Fn 30] Continuing, the Court observed that this conclusion was the far better one, because the consequence of the opposite view was that the four amendments proposed long before, including the two sent out to the States in 1789 "are still pending and in a situation where their ratification in some of the States many years since by representatives of generations now largely forgotten may be effectively supplemented in enough more States to make three-fourths by representatives of the present or some future generation. To that view few would be able to subscribe, and in our opinion it is quite untenable."[Fn 31] What seemed "untenable" to a unanimous Court in 1921 proved quite acceptable to both executive and congressional branches in 1992. After a campaign calling for the resurrection of the 1789 proposal, which was originally transmitted to the States as one of the twelve original amendments, enough additional States ratified to make up a three-fourths majority, and the responsible executive official proclaimed the amendment as ratified as both Houses of Congress concurred in resolutions.[Fn 32] That there existed a "reasonable" time period for ratification was strongly controverted.[Fn 33] The Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice prepared for the White House counsel an elaborate memorandum that disputed all aspects of the Dillon opinion.[Fn 34] First, Dillon's discussion of contemporaneity was discounted as dictum.[35] Second, the three "considerations" relied on in Dillon were deemed unpersuasive. Thus, the Court simply assumes that, since proposal and ratification are steps in a single process, the process must be short rather than lengthy, the argument that an amendment should reflect necessity says nothing about the length of time available, inasmuch as the more recent ratifying States obviously thought the pay amendment was necessary, and the fact that an amendment must reflect consensus does not so much as intimate contemporaneous consensus. |
Fragmentsichter: Schuju (Sichtungsergebnis: Gut) |
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